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Abstract
This paper sets up a model of endogenous product dierentiation to
analyze the variety eects of international trade. In our model multi-
product rms decide not only about the number of varieties they sup-
ply but also about the degree of horizontal dierentiation between
these varieties. Firms can raise the degree of dierentiation by invest-
ing variety-specic xed costs. In this setting, we analyze how trade
integration, i.e. an increase in market size, inuences the number of
rms in the market, the number of product varieties supplied by each
rm, and the degree of dierentiation.
JEL-Classi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If economists talk about the eects of international trade on product va-
riety, they typically have in mind the inuence of trade on the number of
heterogeneous goods. Variety, however, can be much broader than this; it
encompasses not only the mere number of goods but also their specica-
tion. Heterogeneous goods may dier only slightly from each other { for
example just in their color { or substantially with respect to more important
characteristics. Our analysis starts from this observation and endogenizes
product dierentiation in an otherwise standard \love of variety" model of
intra-industry trade. We consider multi-product rms that decide not only
about the number of varieties but also about the degree of horizontal prod-
uct dierentiation between these varieties. The equilibrium degree of product
dierentiation emerges from a trade-o between positive demand eects and
additional product-specic xed costs. International trade may then inu-
ence variety through three dierent channels: by changing (i) the number of
rms on the market, (ii) the number of varieties rms supply, and (iii) the
degree of product dierentiation between these varieties.
Our model of endogenous product dierentiation produces a couple of in-
teresting insights: Firstly, we show that rms regard the number of varieties
and the degree of product dierentiation as complementary instruments if
the cost function satises certain sucient properties. An increasing scope
then makes it more protable for rms to raise the degree of product dier-
entiation and vice versa. The reason is that consumers' valuation of product
dierentiation increases in the number of varieties. Secondly, under the same
sucient conditions an increase in market size results in more varieties per
rm and a higher degree of product dierentiation. Thirdly, the activities of
rms to dierentiate their products horizontally have consequences for mar-
ket entry which are comparable to the case of vertical product dierentiation.
The theoretical literature on international trade has recently become in-
creasingly engaged in analyzing the behavior of multi-product rms.1 Feen-
stra and Ma (2008) consider multi-product rms in a Dixit-Stiglitz model of
intra-industry trade with a uniform elasticity of substitution. In their paper,
rms balance the additional sales generated from introducing new product
varieties against a \cannibalization" of sales of their existing varieties. From
this trade-o Feenstra and Ma (2008) determine the equilibrium number of
varieties per rm, assuming that rms can not inuence the degree of product
dierentiation between varieties. Allanson and Montagna (2005) consider a
1In addition to the papers discussed below, see e.g. Brambilla (2006), Baldwin and Gu
(2006), Bernard et al. (2006), Hansen and Jrgensen (2001), Hansen and Nielsen (2007)
and Nocke and Yeaple (2006).
1nested CES-utility with a lower elasticity of substitution between individual
varieties supplied by a single rm compared to varieties supplied by dierent
rms. Erkel-Rousse (1997) introduces vertical product dierentiation in a
model with multi-product rms and CES-preferences. Both, Allanson and
Montagna (2005) and Erkel-Rousse (1997) neglect the cannibalization eect
by assuming that rms are small and do not allow for endogenous product
dierentiation.
Multi-product rms are also analyzed in models of spatial product dif-
ferentiation, as for example with exible manufacturing.2 According to the
exible manufacturing approach rms cover a whole area around their \core
competence" in a Salop-type circular market. Marginal costs increase with
the distance from a rms' core competence, which limits rms' expansion
over the product space in addition to the cannibalization eect. Other set-
ups of product dierentiation are chosen by Anderson and de Palma (1992
and 2006), who consider a nested logit-demand function, and Ottaviano et al.
(2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), who assume linear-quadratic prefer-
ences. Our paper builds on a Dixit-Stiglitz model with multi-product rms,
but in contrast to the literature mentioned above we let rms determine how
strong cannibalization is by deciding about the degree of product dierenti-
ation.
Since we assume that product dierentiation inuences product-specic
xed costs, our model is related to the endogenous sunk-cost literature.3 Ac-
cording to this literature rms can raise product quality or reduce variable
costs by increasing xed cost investments upon market entry. Shaked and
Sutton (1987) show that under certain conditions a lower bound for individ-
ual market shares exists if xed costs are endogenous. As market size grows,
at least one rm then invests more to retain a certain market share. Eckel
(2006b) incorporates endogenous sunk costs in an otherwise standard model
of intra-industry trade with one product per rm. He assumes that rms
can reduce variable costs by investing sunk costs, and he determines condi-
tions under which the number of rms increases or decreases with market
integration. We show that this result of a possible decline in the number of
rms carries over to the case of multi-product rms with endogenous product
dierentiation. In our set-up, however, a decline in the number of rms is
not equivalent with lower variety as it results from an increase in the number
of product varieties each rm supplies and from a higher degree of horizontal
2For trade models with exible manufacturing see e.g. Eckel (2006a) and Eckel and
Neary (2008).
3See e.g. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Shaked and Sutton (1984, 1987), or Sutton
(1991).
2dierentiation between varieties.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the baseline model. In section 3 we analyze the equilibrium and derive the
inuence of market size on product dierentiation, the number of varieties
per rm, and the number of rms in the market. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a market with m symmetric rms (i = 1:::m). Each of these
rms supplies a continuum of dierentiated varieties with mass n > 1 (the
\number of varieties"). Free market entry determines m endogenously. On
the demand side we assume L households which consume a dierentiated
manufacturing aggregate C and an agricultural good A, the num eraire. Pref-
erences with respect to these two goods are Cobb-Douglas, such that house-
holds spend a constant share  of their income for C and 1  for A. Labor
productivity in the agricultural sector and thereby individual wage income










In (1) the sub-utility ~ ci is an aggregate of all varieties supplied by rm i.
Firms not only decide about the number of varieties ni they supply but
also about the degree of horizontal dierentiation vi between these varieties.
More specically, we assume that each variety of rm i consists of a con-
tinuum of components { distributed uniformly between 0 and 1 { and that
rms can decide whether to dierentiate components or not. The fraction of
dierentiated components embodied in the varieties supplied by rm i then
determines the degree of dierentiation vi (0  vi  1), and the sub-utility
with respect to all varieties of rm i can be specied as:










The rst term of ~ ci measures the part of the sub-utility which results from
dierentiated components and the second term is the part of the sub-utility
derived from non-dierentiated components. For simplicity, we assume per-
fect symmetry between all varieties of rm i. We can then set ci(k) = ci for
4Ferguson (2008) also endogenizes xed costs in a trade model with Dixit-Stiglitz pref-
erences. As Eckel (2006b) he considers a setting with only one product per rm.





i + 1   vi
i
nici : (2)
To interpret the inuence of vi rst consider the limit case vi = 0. In this case
all varieties of rm i are perfect substitutes and ~ ci = nici. The aggregate
of rm i's varieties is just equal to the total quantity produced, and our
model does not dier from a standard Dixit-Stiglitz setting with one product
per rm. In the other extreme vi = 1 and ~ ci = n
=( 1)
i ci. In this case
consumers can substitute dierent varieties supplied by rm i in the same
way as varieties supplied by dierent rms. This is the setting analyzed by
Feenstra and Ma (2008). Most interestingly for our paper are, of course, the
intermediate cases in which 0 < vi < 1.
We can dene xi(ni;vi) by xi  ~ ci=(nici) = vin
1=( 1)
i +1 vi as the sub-
utility generated per unit of output supplied by rm i. This expression, which
can be interpreted as a quality index for products of rm i, monotonically
increases in ni and in vi, i.e. @xi=@vi > 0 and @xi=@ni > 0. An increase
in the number of varieties or in the degree of product dierentiation makes
the product range of rm i more attractive for consumers. We also have
@x2
i=@ni@vi > 0. The marginal utility from raising the degree of product
dierentiation increases in the number of varieties. That is, the more varieties
a rm supplies, the higher consumers value dierentiation between these
varieties. This property of the utility function will become important for the
results of our subsequent analysis.
Utility maximization of consumers leads to an individual demand of











where ~ pi is the price index for the variety range supplied by rm i, i.e.
















Each rm decides about the number of varieties ni, the degree of hor-
izontal product dierentiation between these varieties vi, and their price
pi. With marginal costs of  and xed costs of F, prots of rm i are
i = (pi   )Qi   F. We assume that xed costs of the rm increase in the
number of varieties and in the degree of product dierentiation: F = F(n;v).
More specically, we assume Fn > 0, Fv > 0, Fvv  0, Fnn  0, and Fvn  0.
For later use we may dene n  Fnn=F and v  Fvv=F as the elasticities
4of F with respect to n and v. These elasticities can be interpreted as mea-
sures for economies of scope in the F() function or economies of horizontal
product dierentiation, respectively, as F=n;n = n   1 and F=v;v = v   1.
3 Equilibrium and Trade Integration
This section rst characterizes the equilibrium of our model. From this equi-
librium we can determine the eects of trade integration by raising the size
of the relevant market L. We consider a market with at least 2 active rms,
i.e. m  2. Assuming symmetry of all competitors of rm i (denoted by  i
) we can write the prot of rm i as follows:


















  F : (4)
In equilibrium, the rst order conditions for pi, vi, and ni have to be satised.
In addition, because of free entry rms make zero prots. The rst order





1 + (m   1)
(5)
in the symmetric equilibrium. This rule determines the equilibrium price
as a function of the number of rms m. According to (5), the mark-up
declines in m. If there are more rms in the market, demand becomes more
elastic and as a consequence rms reduce their mark-up. Using (5), the rst
order conditions for ni and vi and the zero-prot condition in the symmetric
equilibrium can be written as
L 
m   1
m[1 + (m   1)]
vn1=( 1)
nx
= Fn ; (6)
L 
m   1







= Fv ; (7)
L 
1
1 + (m   1)
= F : (8)
Were xed costs independent of the number of varieties and the degree of
dierentiation, rms would supply as many varieties as possible and dieren-
tiate them completely. However, cost considerations lead to less dierentia-
tion and to a nite number of varieties. The zero-prot condition determines
the number of rms m as a function of market size L. Not surprisingly,
5dm=dL > 0 for a given n and v. Using (8), the equilibrium can be written
as a system in n and v only:
L   F
























Equation (11) determines the relationship between n and v, which is inde-
























The following lemma describes a sucient condition for a positive relation-
ship between n and v, which follows from (12).
Lemma. An increase in the number of varieties n causes the rm also to

























An increase in market size then raises the number of varieties supplied by
each rm and the degree of horizontal dierentiation between these varieties.
We may further specify the condition in (13) by looking more closely at

















n i Fv;v + 1 > Fn;v :






v i Fn;n + 1  Fv;n :
Hence:
Proposition. An increase in market size L raises the degree of product dif-
ferentiation v and the number of varieties per rm if the xed cost function
satises the following sucient properties:
Fv;v + 1 > Fn;v and Fn;n + 1  Fv;n : (16)
An example for a cost function that satises (16) is F = f + gnexp(v).
The term f then stands for rm-specic xed costs and g exp(v) are variety-
specic xed costs per variety. Variety-specic xed costs increase in v as
fewer components can be standardized and used for all varieties. The cost





< 1 : (17)
An increase in the number of varieties or in the degree of product dierenti-
ation lowers the economies of scope: n
v > 0 and n
n > 0. Similarly, we have
v
v > 0 and v
n > 0. Dierentiating the cost function, we can easily show
that both inequalities in (16) are satised. The number of varieties and the
degree of dierentiation then both increase in the size of the market L. An-
other example is the cost function F = f +gnv +hn. This function has the
interesting property that for the limit of h ! 0 we obtain v=n = , such
that the number of varieties is constant in this special case.
The increase in n and v raises product specic xed costs F(n;v). Con-
sequently, the inuence of market size on the number of rms is ambiguous





























> 0 i 
nL;n + 
vL;v < 1: (20)
Trade integration raises the total number of rms only if the elasticities of
the cost function with respect to product variation times the market size
7elasticity of product variation add up to less than one. This result is related
to ndings of the endogenous sunk-costs literature mentioned in the intro-
duction where the number of rms not necessarily increases as the market
becomes larger. Although the inuence of trade integration on the total num-
ber of rms is indeterminate, the number of rms per country clearly declines
if (16) is satised. Using (19), this follows immediately from the derivative
d(m=L)=dL = (dm=dL   m=L)=L. The number of rms relative to L then
declines in L, and each rm produces on a larger scale.
To determine the welfare eects of trade integration we dene the aggre-






. Then C = = ~ P and aggregate
welfare declines in ~ P. Symmetry implies ~ P = (m)1=(1 )px 1. Welfare de-
pends on the number of rms, the price, and the valuation index x, which in
turn is determined by the product scope and the degree of dierentiation. We
know already that x increases in the size of the market. From the mark-up
formula (5) we obtain
p =
1 +  (m   1)
(m   1)(   1)
 :
The price p declines in the number of rms. Thus, if m increases or if the
decline in m is suciently weak, then welfare clearly increases in L. Although
trade integration raises cost eciency since rms produce on a larger scale, it
will only be welfare enhancing as long as competition intensity does decline
to strongly.
4 Concluding Remarks
Because of its analytical tractability and the strong results it delivers, the
Dixit-Stiglitz model has become a workhorse of modern trade theory. This
paper proposes an approach to endogenize horizontal product dierentiation
in this framework. We formulate a setting in which multi-product rms
not only decide about entry and about the number of varieties they supply
but also about the degree of dierentiation between these varieties. This
approach provides us with a much richer picture of rm behavior than the
standard model. In this concluding section we do not review our results in
detail. Instead, we emphasize what we regard as the central message from
our paper: To evaluate the inuence of trade on product variety it is not
enough to look at the mere number of products. Instead, trade may also
change the degree of horizontal dierentiation between products. The next
step toward a better understanding the variety eects of trade would be an
empirical test of the eects of trade on the degree of product dierentiation.
8Appendix
This appendix derives the comparative static results underlying Proposition
1. The two equilibrium conditions (9) and (10) can be written as
M  U   
n = 0 ; (21)
M  V   

































The terms in (23) are the rst derivatives of the implicit functions (21) and
(22) with respect to n and v, i.e.
a1n = M  Un + U  Mn   
n
n




(V  a1v   U  a2v)ML
jJj
(24)
For meaningful comparative static results we assume a positive sign of the
Jacobian, i.e. jJj > 0. The partial derivative of M with respect to L is
positive: ML > 0. Thus, dn=dL > 0 i V  a1v > U  a2v. Determining a1v
and a2v from (21) and (22) yields:
V  a1v > U  a2v i 
v
v  U > 
n











Inserting from (11) then yields (14).
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